

PALESTINE-ISRAEL CONFLICT: RATIONALISM VS REALISM 1988-2017

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Abstract¹

Realist and Rationalist approaches have been adopted from 1988-2013 in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict in the context of power and interest. The one-state solution, proposed in 1944 and 1964 by the Communist Party and the PLO, a rational proposal by then, was rejected by realists. In 1988, the two-state solution was brought to the international arena by the late PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat. His proposal was considered a compromise by traditional realists. In Israel, this proposal didn't receive much attention, yet in 1993, it became the basics of negotiations with Palestinians. At that time, realists, both in Palestine and Israel refused it. The failure of two-state solution encouraged the rise of one-state solution again when the Palestinian Civil Society in 2005 called for a comprehensive BDS campaign to bring Israel accountable and establish one democratic state for both peoples. The proposal was rejected by the realists who proposed two-state solution, and realists who rejected the idea of two states for two peoples, yet the increasing number of people supporting one-state solution bodes for a promising future for it.

Keywords: Palestine, Israel, Conflict, Realism, Rationalism, One State Solution, Two State Solution, Peace Talks

Introduction

The Palestine/Israel conflict is considered one of the longest conflicts in the modern history. All international proposals and approaches to reach a settlement between Palestinians and Israelis so far failed. As time passed, new ideas were presented but never led to achieving lasting peace between the *Israel and Palestine* peoples. Throughout this conflict, various approaches have been adopted to end it, to no avail. These approaches changed drastically during the different stages of the conflict. When the first wave of Zionist migrants arrived to Palestine and established the Petah Tikvah Colony (Gateway of Hope) (Hebrew: פֶּתַח תִּקְוָה) in 1878, Palestinians were seems not aware of the political agendas of the new arrivals. The Ottomans who were ruling Palestine until 1917 maintained a "realist approach" and rejected Zionists' plans.² This approach continued to be maintained until 1947 when Palestinians, represented by elite families, rejected the Partition Plan which gave Jews 56% of the land, even though they were 33% of the population and owned (*only*) 6% of the land, and gave Palestinians 43% of land while they were two third of the population and owned 94% of land. The Communist Party called for "One Democratic State" in 1944, yet this call was not adopted by elite Palestinian families who kept interest and power calculations in their minds.

Remarkably, in 1968 Fatah Movement, the leading party of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) adopted the idea of one-state for Arabs and Jews.³ On the other hand, the new arrivals of Jews accepted all proposed plans until 1947. The reason they offered readiness to accept all proposed solutions was their desperate need to strengthen their existence in Palestine. In 1988, the PLO adopted a more realist approach, a two-state solution. It calls for establishing a state for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank with East Jerusalem as its capital, which lives in peace next to a secure Israel with the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes in what is today Israel, according to the UNGA 194 Resolution. Nowadays, the two-state solution paradigm is still supported by the vast majority of countries in the world.

Recently, with the impossibility of implementing the two-state solution because of the continuing Israeli colonization of Palestinians' lands, a movement of "new-rationalists", both in Palestine and Israel, emerged. Those civil society organizations, people, along with some politicians, though few in number, call for one-state solution, in two forms, democratic-secular state and bi-national state with the return of Palestinian refugees.⁴ They believe in using non-violent tactics and adopt the Palestinian Civil Society Call for Boycott, Divestment and

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² Mandel, Neville J. (1975), Ottoman Practice as Regards Jewish Settlement in Palestine: 1881-1908. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 33-46.

³ Raef Zreik (2011), "A one-state solution? From a 'struggle unto death' to 'master-slave' dialectics," *Social Identities*, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp. 793-810.

⁴ Marder, M. (2013), Why settlements will lead to a one-state solution, Al-Jazeera: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/08/2013812101040993530.html>

Sanctions (BDS) to pressure Israel to give all people living between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River equal rights. This article will discuss peace proposals since 1988 in Palestine/Israel within the context of rational and realist schools of thoughts of international relations, and answer the coming questions: Could the Palestine/Israel conflict be resolved from a rationalist and realist point of view? How different proposals to end the conflict developed and what were the positions of both rationalists and realists in Palestine and Israel? How will the Palestine/Israel conflict be resolved from International Relations' theories perspective, keeping in mind facts on the grounds? This paper aims to provide an answer to all these questions in the context of international relations schools of thought.

Realism in International Relations

Realism is a school of thought in international relations which came to existence after the First World War and has dominated the study of International Relations along with Liberalism for the last 50 years. Realism is defined as "ought to be assumption that power is the primary end of political action, whether in the domestic or international arena."⁵ Realism investigates the constraints on Politics imposed by human nature and the role of state, rather than international government. It is about power and interest. Realists claim that man is controlled by desire in addition to power. Realists largely focus on the state of anarchy of the state. Competitive self-interest, according to realism, drives world politics.

"To assess the dominance of realism we can examine events happened during cold war and post-cold war era. Cold war era simply testified that realism dominated all the alternative theories in explaining the events between USA and USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republic). Cold war divided world into two ideological camps i.e. Capitalist bloc led by United States and Communist bloc, led by USSR. Both the superpowers engaged in intense struggle for power that ranged from making alliances to waging war. Whatever happened (peace, proxy war) between the relations of both US and USSR during the cold war time is explained by realist school of thought very nicely."⁶

Realism has its theoretical roots in the works of authors such as Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Thucydides among others. All of them were pessimistic about the nature of humans. In their estimation, humans are self-interested beings who will take whatever they are strong enough to take. "Consider that the most prominent realist scholars are all intellectual loners, in the sense that the overwhelming majority of their scholarship is sole-authored. We thinking here of scholars such as E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, John Mearsheimer, Stephen Krasner. One might add George Kennan or Henry Kissinger to that list, as both are normally thought of as "realists" and virtually all their published work appears with a single byline."⁷

The emphasis on the human nature which is characterized by self-interest is one of the core concepts of realism. Maximizing gain and securing self-interest is two of the main components of realism. "Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the "images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving."⁸ The uniqueness of every single situation/case in addition to the consideration of place and time are important to political realists. As facet differences in human natures exist, one need to understand each aspect has to deal with it in its own term. This is to say, if I want to understand a "secular man", I should deal with the secular aspect as if it was the only one. Plus, I must apply the appropriate standards to the "secular sphere", keeping in mind the influences of other aspects on man. "It's inevitable that a theory that tries to understand international politics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would like to see it, must overcome a physiological resistance that most other branches of learning need not face."⁹

The paradigm of political realism is said to be informed and closely intertwined with "classical elite theory", which assumes that minorities always attempt to control societies and associations.¹⁰ According to realists, the ground for the construction of society or the state is the individual self-interest. Society/state is conceptualized as a means to this end. Men created the state only because the state of nature was unbearable. The state was constructed in order to provide men with internal peace and protect them against external enemies. Then, the

⁵ Moseley, Alexander, (2012), *Libertarian Political Realism. Mises Daily.*

⁶ Amin, Musarat, Naseer, Rizwan, & Ishtiaq, Tilak. (2011), *Realism - Dominating Theory in International Relations: An analysis. Berkeley Journal of Social Sciences Vol 1, No 7, pp. 4-5.*

⁷ Walt, Stephen M. (2013), *The Difference Between Realists and Liberals. Foreign Policy Magazine, July 11.*

⁸ Weber, Max. (1920), *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie* (M. Weber, Trans.). Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, p. 54.

⁹ Morgenthau, Hans (1948), *Politics Among Nations & the struggle for power and peace. Nova York, Alfred Kopf.*

¹⁰ Marshall, Alasdair J. (2007), *A Framework for Political Psychology (Vilfredo Pareto's Sociology)*, London: Routledge.

legitimacy and *raison de'état* of a state are based upon whether it fulfills these tasks. Men are expected to obey the sovereign/state so long as it is capable of delivering those services, namely conditions of a secure and peaceful life.

In international relations, Thomas Hobbes's politics has widely been considered as providing a basis for the realist understanding of international relations. Although Hobbes himself did not say much about the relations between states/in his words Leviathans or Commonwealths/his name, together with Niccolo Machiavelli's, is cited in almost all treatments of what has come to be known as 'realism' in the academic international relations. Yet, Hobbes himself is partly responsible for the so-called realist interpretations.¹¹

Rationalism in International Relations

As used in international relations contexts, 'rationalism' seems to refer variously to formal and informal applications of rational choice theory to IR questions, to any work drawing on the tradition of microeconomic theory from Alfred Marshall to recent developments in evolutionary game theory, or most broadly to any 'positive' exercise in explaining foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behavior. In the first two senses, rationalism can be characterized as a method, that is, as a cookbook or recipe for how to explain actions.¹²

Rationalism is a newer theory, and was born after the Cold War, as an outcome of debate between Realism and Liberalism. Rationalism is drawn towards elements of both Realism and Liberalism. Although this theory has seized middle ground between the two, Rationalist theoreticians cannot agree fully to any of the IR theories. Rationalism was "via media" between Liberalism and Realism.¹³

International relations have always been a platform of reason, claimed partially by passions and interests. Actually, the coexistence of those who have tried to shed light on its elements of calculation and carefulness and those stunned by the irrationality of international outcomes and processes has spared the field some of the battles that are underway between rational choice and its critics elsewhere in the social sciences. "In the inconclusive great debates of international relations, those employing rational choice models could be found on either side, particularly in most recent neorealist and neoliberal controversies. The image of rational and unitary state actors has been pervasive in the field; strategic interaction is a given. As a result, rational choice and game-theoretic approaches have been easier to accept."¹⁴

This article applies Realism and Rationalism, two important theories of international relations to the Palestine/Israel conflict from 1988-2017 by examining the various proposed solutions throughout this important historical period of time, in addition to further examining the expected scenarios to end the conflict.

PLO 1988: From Liberation to Statehood

In a dramatic shift, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat declared "Day of Independence" from Algeria in 1988 in a speech he gave before the Palestinian National Council. The declaration, the second of its type, represented a new strategy for the PLO. The first Palestinian Independence Declaration ever was by All Palestine Government in 1948. The Second Declaration of Independence had previously been adopted by the Palestinian National Council, the legislative body of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), by a vote of 253 in favor 46 against and 10 abstentions. It was read at the closing session of the 19th Palestinian National Council held in Algeria. The newborn Palestinian state, though has no physical presence in the Palestinian Territories, was recognized by 100 countries and Yasser Arafat claimed the title of "President of Palestine."

According to a document published by the PLO, the 1988 Declaration of Independence is a historical compromise made by the PLO. Prior to the Declaration of Independence, the PLO had pursued the goal of establishing a single, secular democratic state across all of Palestine, stretching from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River.

¹¹ Ahrensdoerf, Peter, (2000), The Fear of Death and the Longing for Immortality: Hobbes and Thucydides on Human Nature and the Problem of Anarchy. *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 3, pp. 579-593.

¹² Fearon, James, & Wendt, Alexander, (2002), *Handbook of International Relations*. London, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, p. 155.

¹³ Bashota, Bardhok, (2011), The role of theory of international relations in explicating global political events. *Aliria International Review*, vol 1, No 1, pp. 34-46.

¹⁴ Kahler, Miles, (1998), Rationality in international relations. *International Organization*, Vol 52, No 4, pp. 919-941.

The Palestinians' acceptance of a two-state solution represents a historic compromise because it involves relinquishing their claim to sovereignty over 78 per cent of their historic homeland. A two-state solution would see the realization of the Palestinian state on only 22 per cent of mandate Palestine – the West Bank including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, all of which have been occupied by Israel since 1967.”¹⁵

To go back to the 1940s when One State Solution was first proposed, it was viewed by the vast majority of Palestinians as a compromise. Palestinians adopted “a realist” approach against it, where they looked for maximizing their gains and refusing to share their country with the new arrivals of Jewish settlers. Yet, the PLO in 1964 adopted One State Solution again, after the loss of 78% of historical Palestine to the newly established Jewish State in 1948. The adoption of one state solution in 1964 was “a rationalist” move and the adoption of a two-state solution in 1988 was merely “a realist” move. On the other side of the border, Jewish migrants adopted more rationalist position in the 1940 when the One State Solution was first presented and in 1947 when the Partition Plan was proposed, as any solution would bring them gain, a relative gain. Thus, adopting a rational position was their strategy. Yet, in 1964, the Israeli took a realist position. They also refused the PLO proposal to establish One Democratic State in Palestine after they gained 78 percent of land in 1948.

The PLO, many Palestinians argue, took a realist position by accepting to establish a state in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank with East Jerusalem its capital in 1988. For Israel, which has the upper hand, any solution proposed by the PLO was not worthy. Israel took a realist position in 1988 and refused to recognize the Palestinian state since then.

The 1993 Oslo Accords: Statehood Again

The year 1993 witnessed one of the most dramatic shifts in the history of the conflict when the PLO and Israel signed “The Declaration of Principles” in Washington DC, brokered by the American Government. The move assured the adoption of two-state solution by both parties and put an end to decades of violence between Palestinians and Israelis.

On the Palestinian side, some Palestinian factions rejected the agreement and considered it as a great compromise. Traditional Realists asserted Palestinians' right to the land of historical Palestine, which is today Israel. Realists, represented by the PLO factions, saw it as “a step towards liberation”. While on the Israeli side, right wing factions saw in it “surrender to terror”, and the left wing parties believed it will – would - put an end to decades of violence and open the Middle East closed doors in front of Israel.

The Declaration of Principles¹⁶ paved the way to establishing a Palestinian autonomy in some parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The final status issues were left to Palestinian and Israeli negotiators to handle them, including the Status of Jerusalem, the question of Palestinian refugees, water, borders and Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

“In spite of the popular uprising in the occupied Palestinian territories, the Israeli government continues to claim that it went very far in its concessions to the Palestinians at the Camp David summit. These proposals did not, however, guarantee the minimal conditions for creating a viable Palestinian state, nor did they concede our rights over Jerusalem or adequately address the plight of the Palestinian refugees. Instead, the Israelis played on the balance of forces, claiming that their (illegal) settlements in the occupied territories allowed them to modify the borders of 4 June 1967, laid down in UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. This miscalculation was the downfall of the accord worked out in Oslo in 1993.”¹⁷

Israel's realism, again, and the attempt to maximize the country's interests and gains in the negotiations led to Palestinian refusal of the peace proposal, which brought peace talks to an end. The failure of peace talks created a distrustful atmosphere in the Palestinian Territories. It took Palestinians a march by Areal Sharon, the Likud candidate for Prime Minister, to provoke an uprising. The Mitchell report¹⁸ concluded:

¹⁵ PLONAD. (2008). The Historic Compromise: The Palestinian Declaration of Independence and the Twenty-Year Struggle for a Two-State Solution. http://www.ldf.ps/documentsShow.aspx?ATT_ID=1051

¹⁶ Read full text here <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx>

¹⁷ Hussein, Feisal. (2000). Failed compromise at Camp David, *Le Monde Diplomatic*, Dec 2000. <http://mondediplo.com/2000/12/12campdavid>

¹⁸ Mitchell, George J. (2001). Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee Report. U.S: US Department of the State.

The Sharon visit did not cause the “Al-Aqsa Intifada.” But it was poorly timed and the provocative effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be prohibited.

“The Temple Mount is in our hands,” Sharon said, reiterating the radio broadcast from June 1967, when Israeli forces overran Jerusalem and occupied the last portions of Palestinian territory not conquered in 1948.¹⁹ Though Sharon’s message that day was directed to the Israeli public in his run for the leadership of the Likud party, it was received with rage by Palestinians, whose anger after the failure of the Oslo peace process and the collapse of final status negotiations at Camp David two months earlier was simmering. General Sharon’s legacy had long been cemented in the Palestinian narrative: Architect of the invasion of Lebanon; responsible for the vicious massacres at Sabra and Shatila; and, in many ways, founder of the settlement enterprise that by the autumn of 2000 had devastated Palestinian aspirations for statehood.²⁰

The Second Palestinian Uprising (Intifada)

The continuing Israeli occupation, even after the Oslo agreements, was the underlying cause of the second intifada. Palestinians had thought that the 1993 Oslo agreement would lead to better lives, peace, greater freedoms, the end of Israeli control, and, at the end of five years (1998), Palestinian statehood. Oslo was thought to mean the end of Israeli occupation and the start of Palestinian self-determination. When such changes failed to materialize and, in many ways, the situation on the ground worsened in the mid and late 1990s, many Palestinians started to believe that the diplomatic process was a dead end and renewed confrontation was the only alternative. This dynamic explains much of the popular support for the second intifada.

The importance of the Israeli occupation in understanding the outbreak of the second intifada plays into a larger debate about the causes of revolts or uprisings.²¹ The Second Intifada, claimed the lives of 4,228 Palestinians and 1024 Israelis, this does not include 1500 Palestinians who were killed in 2008-2009 Cast Lead Operation and 186 Palestinians who were killed in Israel’s 2012 Pillar of the Clouds. This is in addition to hundreds of Palestinians who were killed in Israel’s various military operations in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The excessive use of violence on both sides brought the fragile peace talks to an end. Israel besieged the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat in his office in Ramallah. Arafat died later after he fell sick suddenly. Reports indicate that he was poisoned.²² Hands were pointed to Israel.

In 2005, Israel unilaterally decided to disengage from the Gaza Strip.²³ Despite the heavy opposition Sharon, then Israel’s Prime Minister, received even within his party, he won the support of his cabinet and the approval of the High Israeli Supreme Court. Israel aimed by disengaging from Gaza to reduce the burden laid on it as an occupying power and focuses more on the West Bank, as Gaza will logically move towards Egypt. Peace talks remained *stalled* and no real progress was made despite American several attempts to revive it. The year 2007 witnessed the Palestinian infighting which ended up with the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas. Palestinians ended up with two governments, one in the Gaza Strip led by Hamas which is rejected by the International Community, and the other is in the West Bank, led by Fatah which is backed by the West. All attempts to reach a Palestinian reconciliation failed so far.

In 2007, another attempt was made to reach a deal between the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah and the Israeli government, led by Ehud Olmert.²⁴ Meanwhile, Israel accelerated settlements construction in the West Bank and building the Separation Wall. One last attempt was made in 2013 by the U.S Secretary of the State John Kerry to revive peace talks. Failure is the expected destiny of these talks, many Palestinians and Israelis believe.

¹⁹ Mohd Roslan Mohd Nor & Abdul Qayyum M Suhaimi, (2018), *Intifadah Al-Aqsa: Kebangkitan Rakyat Palestin*, Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press.

²⁰ AlJazeera, (2010), *Remembering the second intifada*. Retrieved on 30/07/2017. <https://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2003/12/20084101554875168.html>

²¹ Pressman, Jeremy, (2003), The second intifada: Background and causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol 23, No 2, pp. 114-141.

²² Poort, David, & Silverstein, Ken. (2013), Swiss study: Polonium found in Arafat’s bones. <http://www.aljazeera.com/investigations/killing-arafat/swiss-study-polonium-found-arafats-bones-201311522578803512.html>

²³ Hollinder, Brandon, (2005), The Israeli Disengagement Plan: Unilateralism in the Face of Multilateral Agreements. *Human Rights Brief*, vol. 13, no. 1, p. 5.

²⁴ Migdalovitz, Carol, (2007), *Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference*, CRS Reprint for Congress, New York, Mac Graw Hill, p. 5.

Civil Society 2005 Call to One Democratic State: Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions

The continuing failure of peace talks, along with the continuing Israeli colonization of the West Bank, encouraged some Palestinians academics in July 2005 to call upon the International Community and peoples of the world to endorse a comprehensive Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign against Israel, similar to one which targeted the apartheid regime in South Africa, in order to force the Israeli government to end its occupation of Palestine and give equal rights to all people living between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean, in addition to allowing Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.

“We, representatives of Palestinian civil society, call upon international civil society organizations and people of conscience all over the world to impose broad boycotts and implement divestment initiatives against Israel similar to those applied to South Africa in the apartheid era. We appeal to you to pressure your respective states to impose embargoes and sanctions against Israel. We also invite conscientious Israelis to support this Call, for the sake of justice and genuine peace. These non-violent punitive measures should be maintained until Israel meets its obligation to recognize the Palestinian people’s inalienable right to self-determination and fully complies with the precepts of international law by: ending its occupation and colonization of all Arab lands and dismantling the Wall, recognizing the fundamental rights of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel to full equality; and respecting, protecting and promoting the rights of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and properties as stipulated in UN resolution 194.”²⁵

The renewal of debates over one state solution in the Palestinian and Israeli societies represents a new dramatic shift. It means a new rational proposal to approach the conflict in both societies. The failure of two states for two peoples’ paradigm encourages the one state solution, which will guarantee equal rights for both peoples and secures the return of displaced Palestinian refugees. The failure of the two states solution means a failure for Israeli and realists, who want to keep the largest portion of lands in the West Bank, and Palestinian realists and traditional realists, those who call for the liberation of Palestinian from Jordan River of to the Mediterranean Sea, such as Hamas, and those who call for a Palestinian state on 22% of historical Palestine, such as the PA. It also represents a retreat of realists in Israel, who call for two-state solution, yet they confiscate more Palestinian lands, on which the Palestinian state will be established.

The rise of the Palestinian Civil Society is the rise of a new generation of rationalists both in Palestine and Israel, who call for equal rights for all and putting an end to decades of this bloody conflict in the Middle East. Realists, both in the Palestinians territories and Israel, are still dominant, but the increasing number of new rationalists, who support one state solution bodes well. There will come a day when the number of new rationalists who support one state solution will prevail over realists, who support two-state solution, or no solution.

Conclusion

Palestinians and Israelis have adopted realist and rationalist approaches to deal with the conflict depending on their power and interest throughout the history of the conflict. Both rationalists and realists exchanged roles and positions. The Communist Party proposed a rationalist solution back in 1944, a one-state solution which was refused by elite Palestinian families, who themselves refused the Partition Plan in 1947 which called for two states for two peoples. These proposals were refused by some Jewish realists too. Both proposals were accepted by the representatives of Jews who arrived from Europe and the Arab World and later established Israel in 1948. Palestinians at that time were not ready to accept the idea of sharing their country with another people.

In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, represented by the largest Palestinian faction by then Fatah, proposed a one-state solution for all people. In 1988, the PLO accepted a state on 22% of historical Palestine, namely the Gaza Strip and the West Bank (a two-state solution). The proposal was rejected by realists in Israel, while the PLO considered it a compromise “in which it gave up 78% of historical Palestine.”

In Israel, a realist approach was adopted against both moves. The right wing in Israel refused the one-state solution and the two-state solution proposed by the PLO in 1964 and 1988. The equitation of interest and power was behind this change in positions. The continuing failure of what is called “peace talks” between the Palestinian Authority and Israel made many Palestinians sure that a lasting peace in which Palestinians have their own state will not be at hand in the near future. Thus the Palestinian Civil Society Call came to existence in 2005 which

²⁵ BDS, (2005), Palestinian Civil Society Call for BDS. <http://www.bdsmovement.net/call>

called for a comprehensive boycott of Israel until it abides by International Law. The BDS call represents a dramatic shift in which the voice of a new generation of rationalists in Palestine and Israel rises to the surface. They call for one-state for Arabs and Jews with the return of Palestinian refugees, a country in which all are entitled to the same rights. With facts on the grounds and the continuing failure of two state solution's paradigm, one-state solution is likely to prevail in the coming years.

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